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Over the last few years there has been a remarkable growth in the amount of 
scholarly attention given to the internationalisation of economic activity. While a 
good deal of interest has also been generated by concomitant and 
interconnected political developments, both domestically and internationally, less 
attention has been given to the impact of such developments upon workers and 
organised labour. And yet labour not only remains a potentially important 
influence upon the way international economic force are mediated at the national 
level, but it is an important index of the impact international economic change 
and the success of national policies of structural adjustment.  
 
In this article we consider the ways labour in two quite different nations - 
Australia and Indonesia - have attempted to come to terms with changing 
economic and political circumstances. In particular, we examine labour's 
participation in the distinctive political accommodations that have developed in 
very different national contexts. A comparison of such disparate national political 
economies is valuable for several reasons. First it provides an important 
corrective to some of the more undifferentiated ‘globalisation’ and ‘convergence’ 
theorists, and the implicit suggestion that economic development is either 
unilinear or likely to generate similar political outcomes. Second, it illustrates not 
only the sorts of enduring differences in national political practices that are 
obscured in less nuanced accounts, but also highlights some surprising 
commonalties that are generally neglected by accounts which privilege the 
economic aspects of internationalisation processes. Third, this sort of 
comparative exercise has important theoretical implications. We shall draw 
attention to the respective national experience with different forms of corporatist 
social relations in particular, and consider the implications for state-society 
relations more generally.  
 
The article is divided into four parts. In the first section we briefly consider some 
of the more important international developments to which national labour 
movements have had to respond. The second and third sections present case 
studies of the Australian and Indonesian experiences respectively. Particular 
attention is paid to the way in which state-capital-labour relations are defined 
within the context of specific historical and political experiences. The final section 
draws out the implications of this comparison and assesses its implications for 
both national labour movements. Although the historical setting in both countries 
is discussed, the major focus of attention is the last twenty years or so, when the 
internationalisation of economic activity became a greater influence on domestic 
policy.  
 
The Changing Economic Environment  
It has become a commonplace of international political economy literature to 
detail the internationalisation of economic activity that has occurred in the last 
several decades (Dicken, 1992). There is no intention to add to this voluminous 
literature here, other than by detailing some of the specific circumstances 
relevant to Indonesia and Australia below. Yet it is important to recognize that the 
internationalisation process has altered the circumstances confronting 
established labour movements in advanced industrial countries like Australia, as 
well as struggling ones in late industrializing countries like Indonesia. The 
enhanced mobility of productive and finance capital has greatly increased its 
power relative to predominantly immobile labour forces and national 
governments. Not only does footloose capital have the opportunity to play off one 
state against another, but it has the potential to demand ‘favourable investment 
climates,’ which in many cases has meant disciplining or placing restrictions on 
the activities of labour.  
 
One of the most significant effects of the changes to the world economy has, 
therefore, been an increase the ‘structural’ power of capital (Strange, 1988). 
However, while the position of capital has clearly been enhanced by the 
restructuring of the international economy (Kolko, 1988), it is also important to 
recognize that making sense of such changes is an inherently political exercise. 
The notion of ‘globalisation’ has been accepted more or less uncritically by some 
scholars - as well as commentators and policy-makers 1 - generating rather 
generalised conclusions about the potential beneficial impact of such 
developments on individual governments and the social formations over which 
they claim authority. Yet as Wade (1996: 61) emphasizes, the world economy 
remains ‘more inter-national than global.’ Indeed, the international economic 
system was actually more ‘open’ in terms of trade and capital flows in the period 
before the First World War, than it was during the early 1970s thirst and 
Thompson, 1996). What is significant about the notion of globalisation for our 
purposes is that it may be deployed discursively in order to define economic and 
political ‘reality’ (Cerny, 1996). National governments can invoke external 
competition as an implacable imperative which necessitates and legitimates 
domestic reforms and the development of more ‘flexible,’ ‘responsible,’ 
‘competitive’ and generally disciplined labour forces. 2  
 
This is not to suggest that the globalisation discourse has no material basis. On 
the contrary, changes in the international organisation of productive processes 
have had a profound impact on the position of labour. Of most immediate 
significance here has been the trans-nationalisation of the production process 
itself. While not without its theoretical difficulties, Frobel et al's (1978) seminal 
conception of the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) drew attention to 
the way companies are increasingly able to disaggregate production processes 
and take advantage of a dispersed, global pool of labour. The potential mobility 
of international capital, even where it is directly tied to the production of goods 
and services, is a challenge to both national labour forces that increasingly find 
themselves in direct competition with one another, and to the autonomy of 
individual governments.  
 
Organised labour has been more directly affected by transformations in the 
nature of work and in the structure of labour markets (Reich, 1991). While the 
nature of such changes display important differences between countries like 
Australia and Indonesia, there are also some notable similarities. At one level this 
is not surprising: in an international economy in which individual governments are 
choosing to open national economic spaces to external economic forces, national 
policy autonomy is becoming increasingly constrained. In an era where the state 
itself is considered to be a major source of national competitive advantage 
(Cerny, 1990), the way the state-labour relation is mediated by national 
governments remains a major influence on the investment decisions of 
transnational corporations and the place of individual nations in the international 
division of labour. What is of significance here is that many governments have 
responded to competitive pressures by instigating policies of ‘competitive 
austerity,’ in which they seek to drive down domestic costs production oriented 
toward external markets (Albo, 1994).  
 
Despite the ubiquity of some of these structural challenges to labour, there are 
contingent factors that distinguish each nation. Workers in late industrializing 
countries like Indonesia with a chronic over-supply of labour face major 
difficulties in developing effective labour movements. Though the relationship 
between the emergence of effective labour movements and the tightening of 
labour markets is far more complex than is usually conceded by neo-classical 
economists, a chronic labour surplus is clearly a constraint on potential labour 
power (Manning, 1995). Moreover, for many transnationally-organised capitalists 
operating in Indonesia, its attractiveness lies in its cheap labour and a generally 
unorganised labour force (Hadiz, forthcoming). Any change in these conditions 
could simply facilitate relocation decisions to the apparently endless supply of 
Third World countries offering some measure of political stability plus a cheap 
and domesticated labour force.  
 
The particular problems facing organised labour in Indonesia and late 
industrializing countries more generally highlight the importance of the timing of 
the industrialisation process in terms of the specific sets of problems that it 
generates. As Winters (1996:218-9 observed:  
 
While industrialisation unfolded in the North, most of the rest of 
the world either was excluded or took part as colonised suppliers 
of raw materials or consumers of imported goods. This 
arrangement not only fuelled the wealth of the North but also 
permitted labour to struggle against capital over the surplus from 
production (not to mention reshaping the broader political-legal 
milieu) without having to content with direct competition from an 
almost endless supply of workers in the colonies who were far 
poorer and had no hope of ginning wider political leverage. 
Colonies and colonizers were deeply intertwined and yet in 
important respects were quite insulated from each other. The 
great strides northern labourers made both economically and 
politically were promoted by this insulation.  
 
The international context has now radically changed. The impossibility of any 
longer insulating immobile national labour forces, even at the early stages of 
industrialisation, from external competition and market pressures is an especially 
significant development for workers in late industrializing countries like Indonesia.  
While the timing of industrialisation is critical, it is also important not overlook the 
significance of the constellations domestic class forces that shape the specific 
trajectories of national economic development and political accommodation. 
Deyo (1987) suggests that some Latin American regimes pursued import 
substitution industries that fostered broad populist coalition - including organised 
labour - because they confronted substantial labour movements that could not be 
easily repressed. In contrast, East Asian developmentalist states - Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan - were insulated from the need to accommodate 
worker demands because organised labour was already effectively subordinated 
and repressed before these countries embarked on export-led development 
strategies based on low-wage manufactures.  
 
Thus, the way labour movements are incorporated (or excluded) from domestic 
political processes is largely dependent on their strength relative to the state and 
capital, be it ‘national’ or international, and the timing of the industrialisation 
process itself. The case studies below demonstrate that even where government-
labour accommodations seemingly display theoretically similar ‘corporatist’ 
structures, their actual operation and deployment by government is highly 
contingent on specific historical and political contexts. Moreover, the manner in 
which nations respond to external economic imperatives continues to display a 
good deal of national variation and reflects the influence of domestic economic 
structures, particularly the way each national economy is articulated with the 
international one (Beeson, 1996a).  
 
The following two sections consider how the impact of heightened external 
competition and the generalised restructuring of the international economy were 
mediated in the highly different settings of Australia and Indonesia.  
 
Australia  
The response of organised labour in Australia to the most recent phase of 
economic liberalisation cannot be understood without reference to the 
movement's historical role in Australia's economic and political development. The 
trade union movement has been one of the principal political forces that has 
shaped not only Australia's distinctive pattern of industrial relations, but also the 
wider accommodations reached between business, organised labour and the 
state. Indeed, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) developed as the political wing of 
the trade union movement with the explicit, goal of advancing the interests of 
working people. Organised labour in Australia has been able to take advantage 
of fortuitous circumstances in the international economy to secure comparatively 
high living standards, and to institutionalise its own position in the: Australian 
political economy.  
 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, wage determination in Australia has 
been a highly institutionalised, centrally determined affair, with a series of 
councils and tribunals operating under state auspices to set wage levels and 
ensure some degree of equity. Importantly, the establishment of an arbitration 
system to determine wage levels was seen by governments as a way of 
containing the labour militancy that had culminated in a traumatic and destructive 
series of industrial conflicts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Ultimately, this produced a distinctive Australian ‘historic compromise’. Castles 
(1988) suggests that in addition to the arbitration system, what he calls 
Australia's ‘domestic defence’ was characterised by the protection of 
manufacturing industry through a tariff protection scheme, the control of 
immigration, and an income maintenance system for those outside the labour 
market. In short, the state was the central actor in maintaining a distributional 
system which ensured some benefit for all, and which effectively insulated the 
Australian economic space from the wider world economy.  
 
It was a system that endured in a relatively coherent form until the 1970s. From 
the late 1960s, however, external economic pressures caused the system to 
unravel, making wage determination increasingly difficult for the arbitration 
commission to manage (Dabscheck, 1994). High levels of global economic 
growth produced full employment in Australia, which in turn led to greater upward 
pressure on domestic wage levels, undermining the efficacy of the centralised 
system. Simultaneously, the limitations of Australia's inwardly-oriented industrial 
policies were becoming more apparent (Bell, 1993). Rapid Asian industrialisation 
to Australia's north placed increasing pressures on Australian-based producers 
and revealed the uncompetitive nature of much ‘Australian’ produce. Australia's 
manufacturing decline had two particularly noteworthy consequences: First, it 
increased Australia's reliance on increasingly volatile and less valuable 
commodity products; despite Australia's early industrialisation, policy failures 
conspired to make its export profile more like Indonesia's. Second, increasing 
exposure to international economic pressures and competition exacerbated a 
rapid decline in manufacturing jobs and union membership. For both Australian 
governments and organised labour, therefore, there were compelling incentives 
to try and revitalize domestic manufacturing industry, encourage exports and 
make ‘the Australian economy’ more competitive. 3  
 
Australian Corporatism  
In 1983, after a series of economic political traumas during the 1970s, the ALP 
was elected under the leadership of Bob Hawke, inaugurating a style of social 
relations in Australia that have been dubbed ‘corporatist’. Before assessing the 
Australian experience, it is important to distinguish what is meant by corporatism 
and how the Indonesian and Australian cases differ. Schmitter's (1979) important 
distinction between ‘societal’ and ‘state’ corporatism is especially useful here. 
The societal variant, predicated upon politically open and ideologically 
competitive systems is predominantly associated with industrialised liberal 
democracies like Australia. State corporatism, by contrast, is ideologically 
exclusive, based on one party rule, and associated with late capitalist 
development like Indonesia's. As we shall see, Australia's corporatist experiment 
was incompletely realised. However, what is of interest here is that, while very 
different to Indonesia's, Australia's attempt to forge a new relationship between 
state and labour in response to changing economic: and political circumstances 
was driven by similar external imperatives.  
 
Hawke's ‘big idea,’ and the centrepiece of his election triumph in 1983, was for 
Australia to develop a more ‘consensual’ approach to determining national 
economic outcomes, a strategy that achieved its most complete form in the 
‘Accord’ with the trade union movement. As the ex-leader of the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Hawke had the political authority and the trade 
union connections to impose a new pattern on Australian industrial relations. The 
Accord was initially envisaged as a comprehensive agreement between 
government and the trade union leadership to encourage full-employment 
through a range of policy initiatives on prices, wages and working conditions, 
non-wage incomes, as well as taxation and government expenditure (Stilwell, 
1986). It rapidly became apparent that the Accord's more ambitious, corporatist 
agenda of including private business in a tripartite mechanism was fraught with 
difficulty. ‘Australian business’ was a highly disparate group of transnational and 
nationally based groups, with divergent interests that reflected the scale and 
sectoral location of the enterprises concerned. One of the few issues upon which 
businesses' various peak representative bodies could be guaranteed to agree 
was the necessity of ensuring management autonomy, particularly in the face of 
perceived growing union influence on government (McEachern, 1991).  
 
The apparent increased influence of the ACTU leadership and the establishment 
of tripartite consultative mechanisms like the Economic Planning Advisory 
Council (EPAC) led some observers to suggest that an era of corporatist 
relations was emerging in Australia (Gerritsen, 1986). In retrospect, however, 
mechanism; like EPAC had little impact or business support (Singleton, 1986), 
and did nothing to diminish the structural power of capital. The possibility of any 
fundamental reordering of the balance of power between capital and labour was 
rendered less likely by the Labour government systematically implementing a 
series of economic reforms that were designed to make the market, rather than 
the state, the central determinant of economic outcomes. Indeed, the ALP's 
Accord relationship with labour allowed it to nullify potential political opposition to 
policies of deregulation and liberalisation that might have been vigorously 
opposed by the trade union movement had the ALP not been in office. An index 
of how pervasive the influence of market driven reform has been in Australia is 
the extent to which the trade union movement or, more accurately, its elite 
representative body, has adopted the language and accepted the logic of market-
oriented re, form (Campbell, 1993).  
 
The most immediate impact of the market reforms which the ACTU leadership 
supported has been a continuing decline in trade union membership, dropping 
from more than 50% of the workforce in 1976, to just less than 40% in 1992 
(Western, 1996). Compounding and reflecting this decline has been a 
simultaneous reduction in manufacturing as a proportion of national GDP, Falling 
from 20 to 14% since 1973/4, with the direct loss of some 400,000 manufacturing 
jobs (Colebatch, 1996). True, an entrenched level of high unemployment is not at 
problem that is confined to Australia, or even the western world, but what is 
striking about the Australian case is that it has gone further than most countries 
in instigating neoliberal reforms, despite there being little evidence to suggest 
that such initiatives have had a beneficial impact on economic outcomes in 
Australia. Indeed, the most notable effects of the deregulation process appear to 
have been heightened economic instability as a result of increasing exposure to 
the international economy (Argy, 1996), coupled with a growing disparity of 
wealth distribution in a country in which the notion of egalitarianism has figured 
prominently in national political discourse.  
 
The high point of an alternative union vision for Australian industry that embraced 
socially egalitarian principles was undoubtedly Australia Reconstructed 
(ACTU/TDC, 1987), which provided a sophisticated, Swedish-inspired blueprint 
for comprehensive economic reform in Australia. The rejection of this more 
cooperative form of capitalism reflected both the government's commitment to 
continuing market-oriented, rather than state-directed reform, and the enduring 
power of private capital (Beeson, forthcoming).  
 
By the time the union movement produced Australia Reconstructed, the Labour 
leadership was completely under the sway of influential orthodox economists and 
committed to pushing through the liberalisation process (Beilharz, 1994). 
Therefore, the Accord, rather than more fully-blown corporatist plans like 
Australia Reconstructed, became the preferred vehicle for advancing the 
interests of organised labour. Thus, despite a comparatively strong and 
apparently influential organised labour movement, the trade union leadership 
was co-opted into a quasi-corporatist regime which while ostensibly intended to 
manage the process of structural adjustment in Australia, effectively neutered the 
labour movement as an independent political force.  
 
The Contemporary Situation in Australia  
In retrospect one of the most striking developments under successive Labour 
governments has been a deep-seated transformation of the mechanisms with 
which industrial relations are conducted in Australia. In place of the centralised 
arbitration system, a new pattern of decentralised, enterprise level bargaining 
structures has been established (Brosnan and Bignell, 1994). The election in 
1996 of a Liberal-National Party Coalition government seems certain to further 
entrench the move toward decentralised wage determination and the 
concomitant diminution of the trade union movement's influence in determining 
economic outcomes. This is hardly surprising: attempting to diminish perceived 
trade union influence has long been central to the Coalition's industrial relations 
strategy (Reith, 1989). Significantly the trade union movement and the Labour 
Party had themselves already adopted many of these ideas and made their 
subsequent institutionalisation by a Coalition government much less problematic.  
In Australia, then, organised labour confronts an ideologically hostile 
government, and the rapid reduction of occupations that have historically been 
the core of its industrial strength (Gregory, 1993). While influential voices on the 
left of the labour movement have called for a more militant form of ‘strategic 
unionism’ to challenge the neoliberal orthodoxy and promote alternative 
economic strategies, it is not clear how effective this will be given that the ability 
to take industrial action will be severely curtailed under the Coalition's 
government's Workplace Relationship legislation (Marris, 1996). Moreover, it is 
revealing that even the more ‘radical’ aspects of proposed union strategies are 
predicated upon a conception of ‘the national interest’ and the need for 
cooperating with business (Evatt Foundation, 1995).  
 
During a decade of Labour governments in Australia, the trade union movement 
appears to have adopted the overarching rationale and language of its political 
wing, the ALP. Certainly, the embrace by labour of greater ‘pragmatism’ has not 
been a phenomenon confined to Australia but one which has been widely 
embraced by other developed economies. What the Australian case reveals, 
however, is that even with a broadly sympathetic government in office, Australian 
trade unions were unable to either maintain the numbers or living standards of 
members. Before assessing whether this sustains a more generalised point 
about the role of labour in an increasingly internationalised economy, and what 
sort of implications this may have for internationally-oriented trade union 
activities, it is appropriate to examine our second case study: that of Indonesia.  
 
Indonesia  
As in Australia, over the last decade or so there has been a shift in Indonesia to 
more export-oriented economic development strategies. The change has been 
driven by a desire to try and achieve a favourable niche in the NIDL, an ambition 
that is considered to require making Indonesia both attractive to international 
investors and increasing ‘national competitiveness.’ In spite of the continuing 
influence of strategies based on economic nationalism and self-reliance within 
sections of the state bureaucracy, the international neoliberal development 
orthodoxy has become dominant because of external competitive pressures and 
the restructuring of the world economy, especially the historic decline in oil 
prices. The revenue from the oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s gave 
Indonesian policy-makers a high level of autonomy in relation to international 
capital, which enabled the state to finance development with little regard for the 
wishes and demands of foreign investors. The subsequent fall of international oil 
prices resulted in that autonomy being greatly circumscribed. Indeed, the 
bargaining position of the Indonesian state vis a vis foreign capital state has 
fluctuated in accordance with the price of oil in the international market (Winters, 
1996).  
 
An important element of Indonesia's outward looking approach - given additional 
encouragement by key Western governments and international aid organisations, 
such as the World Bank and IMF - has been the drive to increase Indonesia's 
manufactured exports. This strategy is predicated upon making Indonesia 
attractive to international investors and increasing ‘national competitiveness.’ The 
emphasis has been on labour-intensive industries such as textiles, garments and 
footwear, taking advantage of Indonesia's cheap and abundant labour force. 
Indonesia's perceived comparative advantage in these sorts of industries has 
meant that stringent state controls over labour -- which predate the ascendance 
of the neo-liberal orthodoxy -- acquired renewed legitimacy and importance.  
 
Labour Politics and History  
However, it would be misleading to suggest that stringent controls over labour in 
Indonesia are attributable directly to the shift to a more outward looking 
development strategy in the last decade or so. On the contrary, they are the 
product of political struggles which pre-date the establishment of the New Order 
in 1966, mainly involving the army and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). 
Until the bloodbath which accompanied the establishment of the army-dominated 
New Order, the PKI presided over the largest and most active trade union 
federation in the country, SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia; 
the All-Indonesia Central Workers' Organisation). SOBSI's elimination, together 
with the PKI, automatically meant that labour would be significantly weakened as 
a social force at the onset of the New Order. 4 Thus, from this point on, state 
planners would largely be insulated from the demands of organised labour when 
charting development strategies.  
 
In 1973, as the culmination of a long and complicated process of elite-initiated 
manoeuvres, the remaining labour organisations - most of whom had aligned 
themselves with the army against the dominant SOBSI- were cajoled into 
establishing the FBSI (Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia; All-Indonesia Labour 
Federation) as the sole, state-sanctioned labour entity (Hadiz, forthcoming). With 
the establishment of the FBSI the labour movement was directed to confine itself 
to the strictly ‘social and economic’ realm (Sudono, 1981), and to eschew overt 
engagement in politics. Under the New Order, a vigorous labour movement 
independent of the state has been consistently regarded as a potential threat to 
the maintenance of order and stability, considered essential to the pursuit of 
economic development. In 1974, the doctrine of ‘Pancasila Industrial Relations’ 
established a distinctive form of state-capital-labour relations in Indonesia, on the 
grounds that Indonesia required a framework rooted in its authentic cultural 
values, which supposedly emphasised harmony and co-operation. In this 
essentially corporatist world-view, the state is conceived as playing the role of 
benevolent father to capital and labour, while industrial action is seen to 
contravene the principle of harmonious relations. 5  
 
In 1985 the FBSI underwent a transformation into the even more centralised, 
hierarchical, and therefore more easily controlled, SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh 
Indonesia, All-Indonesia Workers' Union), before yet again being re-christened in 
1995, as the FSPSI (Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, Federation of 
All-Indonesia Workers' Unions). The main role of the union in its various 
incarnations is to prohibit the development of labour organising vehicles outside 
of the control of the state. It is significant that the initial transformation of the FBSI 
into the SPSI took place at the same time that Indonesia embarked on its export 
drive, and followed a period of increased military intervention into labour affairs, 
especially in the quelling of strike action. Thus state corporatism in Indonesia has 
clearly been predicated on the control and demobilisation of labour as a social 
force.  
 
The Contemporary Situation  
In recent years, however, the monopoly enjoyed by the state-backed union has 
been challenged by a proliferation of independent organising activities which 
have often taken place in conjunction with labour-based non-government 
organisations (NGOs). Some have attempted to establish alternative trade 
unions (which the government has not recognised) while others work in lower-
profile groups at the community level. Thus, analysis of labour's response to 
changing economic, social and political conditions in Indonesia cannot be 
confined to the official, state-legitimated corporatist structures which a growing 
number of Indonesian workers reject.  
 
Indeed, contradictions have begun to emerge within the framework of state-
capital-labour relations as Indonesia's urban industrial working class grows and 
slowly matures. In spite of stringent state controls over labour, the 1990s, have 
witnessed a major escalation of working class organisation outside the (F)SPSI 
and greater industrial unrest. Most of these cases of industrial unrest have had to 
do with demands for higher wages and better working conditions, while others 
have involved issues pertaining to the freedom to organise. In 1989, for example, 
when labour was perhaps most quiescent (following widespread military 
intervention into labour affairs), there were, according to official statistics, only 19 
cases of strike action in all of Indonesia. However, in spite of a repressive social 
and political context, official statistics note 350 cases of strike action taking place 
in 1996, though even this must be treated as an extremely conservative estimate 
as many strikes go unreported (Pulahta Setditjen Binawas, 1996). Indeed there 
has keen a dramatic escalation of labour unrest throughout: the 1990s. In 
Australia, by contrast, thanks largely to the Accord, strike activity has declined 
dramatically over the last ten or fifteen years (Peetz, 1996).  
 
In Indonesia, repressive actions designed to curb labour unrest and the possible 
development of a non-state sanctioned labour movement continue. The response 
of the government has been to adopt a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy which maintains 
strict control over such labour rights as freedom to organise, but allows for 
periodic increases in the state-defined minimum wage. Between 1990 and 1997 
the minimum wage in the Jakarta area, for example, has virtually tripled (though 
it still less than USS 2.50 per day). Significantly, these reforms have been carried 
out in spite of business protests about the purported threat rising wages may 
pose to Indonesia's export competitiveness and the success of the export drive. 
The fact that the labour unrest is continuing suggests the policy of raising the 
minimum wage to placate workers has not been entirely successful.  
 
It is notable that business suggestions that the rise in minimum wages has 
caused intolerable burdens have usually been dismissed by the government. 
Indeed, the Minister of Manpower, Abdul Latief, has argued that because labour 
costs constitute such a small portion of total production costs, the rise in 
minimum wages will only have a marginal effect (Forum Keadilan , 1995), Latief's 
insistence on raising wage levels despite business protestations - including those 
of some overseas investors - is designed to curb industrial unrest without 
conceding the more politically-charged issue of the freedom to organize. The 
kind of accommodation that Latief is seeking to establish is one that incorporates 
some of the demands of workers for better wages, but which does not allow for 
the unraveling of existing state corporatists arrangements. Consequently, 
recognition of alternative trade union federations remains out of the question.  
In the specific context of contemporary, very late industrialising Indonesia, 
business is an essentially conservative force that has hindered an enduring 
accomodation with labour. The stance adopted by capital toward labour in 
Indonesia is attributable not only to the continuing weakness of labour itself, but 
also to the deeply-rooted perception in the business community that the state's 
principal concern remains the maintenance of order and stability. For example, 
the manager of one European textiles firm pointed out that ‘when it came to the 
crunch, we can rely on the security forces to restore order.’ 6 The phase of 
reformism, he conjectured, would pass by. In addition, businesses are keenly 
aware that the high level of surplus labour in the market acts as to undercut 
labour's bargaining position. Phil Knight, Chief Executive Officer of Nike, when 
asked about the subsistence-level wages paid to workers pointed out that ‘there 
were thousands of Indonesians lined up outside the factory gates, waiting for 
jobs.’ 7 Significantly, much of the surge in foreign investment in Indonesia's 
manufacturing sector since the mid-1980s has come from East Asian NICs like 
South Korea, where firms have been troubled by rising labour costs and unrest 
(Thee, 1993; Shin and Lee, 1995). The owners of such mobile assets are keenly 
aware of their ability to move again if the investment climate in Indonesia 
becomes less attractive. 8 Indeed, internationally mobile capital is now in an 
especially strong bargaining position vis a vis immobile states and working class 
movements like those of very late industrialising Indonesia.  
 
Thus, the current international context and the domestic configuration clearly do 
not facilitate an accommodation between state, capital and labour in Indonesia 
which is generous to organised labour. Australia's industrialisation occurred in a 
less internationally competitive atmosphere, allowing the possibility of a far more 
generous accommodation. Labour in Indonesia has found it more difficult to 
develop and organize not simply because of its weakness compared to the state 
and capital, but because of international competitive pressures that continually 
undercut it bargaining power.  
 
Discussion  
A comparison of the Indonesian and Australian experiences reveals some 
surprising similarities as well as more predictable differences. Both are important, 
firstly as correctives to an undifferentiated globalisation thesis, and secondly 
because they shed light on the generally neglected role of labour in this process.  
In both Indonesia and Australia national governments have developed - or at 
least experimented with - forms of corporatist social arrangements as a way of 
adjusting to the demands of international economic structural adjustment. 
However, the historical experiences of the two nations are significantly different, 
having been shaped by contingent domestic forces. In Australia, the independent 
and historically influential presence of organised labour within the Australian 
polity meant that the particular corporatist-style accommodation reached 
between labour and government during the 1980s was ‘consensual,’ voluntaristic 
and embedded in a broadly pluralist political tradition. As we have seen, 
corporatism in Australia was always tentative and incomplete, the result of 
capital's failure to cooperate, and a government-inspired, market-oriented policy 
framework that effectively undercut the possibility of more cooperatively 
negotiated economic outcomes (McEachern, 1991). What is significant for our 
purposes, however, is that something approaching a corporatist strategy was 
seen as appropriate given Australia's deteriorating economic position.  
 
In Indonesia, corporatist-style arrangements were also seen as central to 
government strategies of economic adjustment and political stability. Here, 
however, Indonesia's very different historical experience and trajectory meant 
that it was ‘state’ rather than ‘societal’ corporatism that prevailed, and a rather 
different political logic that informed it. Indonesian corporatism had its origins in 
the intense political struggle between sections of the labour movement which 
supported the Communist Party and the army in the pre-New Order period. 
Given this historical legacy, it is not surprising that the army-dominated New 
Order had maintained that a politically domesticated labour movement is an 
essential ingredient of successful economic development.  
 
At present, the patterns of government-labour relations in Australia and 
Indonesia appear to be diverging, convergence theories notwithstanding. 
Whereas Indonesia appears to be attempting to retain a form of state 
corporatism that ensures continuing control of labour, Australia's current Liberal-
National coalition government seems intent on dismantling any remnants of 
state-sponsored wage determination or nationally based negotiation with labour. 
Despite this apparent divergence of approach, striking resonances in overall 
governmental logic remain. In both countries the spectre of globalisation in 
particular and the implacable pressure of international competition in general 
have been invoked to justify and legitimate different policy initiatives. For 
example, the notion of globalisation is routinely deployed in Australia to explain 
the current strategy of promoting labour market and workplace ‘flexibility’: to 
make ‘Australia’ a more competitive place it is important to remove impediments 
to the efficient operation of market forces within the national economy 
(Henderson, 1997).  
 
In Indonesia, globalisation and the threat of international competition have been 
similarly invoked, but to serve a distinctive contingent political purpose. To 
ensure Indonesia's advantageous integration into global structures government 
strategy is predicated upon retaining control of its principal attraction to footloose 
multinational corporations - disciplined and competitively priced labour. 
Moreover, the overarching logic that underpins Indonesia's distinctive response 
to the exigencies of international economic restructuring has also helped to 
legitimise the kind of corporatist structures that facilitate government control over 
society-based forces and movements, particularly the labour movement.  
 
The governments of both countries, then, have utilised the idea of international 
economic change to legitimate policies that reflect the interests of powerful 
economic and political forces within each nation. While specific policies and 
forms of accommodation between government and labour may differ for a range 
of contingent historical reasons, the overarching logic of internationally driven 
domestic reform is common to both. Governments in both countries, therefore, 
show a surprising degree of similarity in important elements of their strategic 
thinking, something that is reinforced by a wider international consensus (Gill, 
1993). Indeed, in a significant extension of this externally derived legitimisation 
and ideational influence, certain ‘Asian values’ have been approvingly cited by 
conservative political leaders in Australia in support of repressive political 
initiatives (Rodan and Hewison, 1996). Contrary to the more optimistic 
predictions of modernisation theory or believers in the ‘end of history,’ therefore, 
ideational influence is not a one-way street leading from ‘west’ to ‘east’ with the 
liberal democratic state as its inevitable terminus. 9 
 
The Limits to Solidarity  
Given the historically different patterns of development, social practices and 
political traditions in Australia and Indonesia, what are the possibilities for 
cooperative activity between the two countries - especially their respective 
workforces - in an effort to overcome the structural disadvantages imposed by 
the emerging global economic order?  
 
A contemporary dispute in Western Australia, a state dominated by a 
conservative Liberal-National Party coalition government, illustrates some of 
these issues and suggests there is little basis for optimism. Controversial 
industrial relations reforms which radically undermine the organisational capacity 
and strength of organised labour have been enacted by a state minister who 
specifically cited the Asian models of industrial relations as his principal influence 
(Pryer, 1997). Despite the unprecedentedly low levels of industrial disputation 
and an overall decline in the cost of labour that the previous Accord mechanisms 
delivered, governments in Australia at both the Federal and state levels are 
taking advantage of changing domestic and international economic: 
circumstances to consolidate labour relations reforms that are inimical to labour 
and appear ideologically driven. Importantly, they are subscribing to an Asian 
benchmark.  
 
The dispute in Western Australia also illustrates the strategic difficulties faced by 
labour in an increasingly internationalised environment. The principal constraint 
continues to be its relative immobility compared with that of capital. Capital's 
increased geographical mobility and the implicit threat of withdrawal means that 
individual transnational corporations can successfully play off one country 
against another, and even nationally based subsidiaries within the same 
company (Barnett and Cavanagh, 1995). In addition, Wood has persuasively 
argued that there has been a direct transfer of some 9 million manufacturing 
sector jobs from the ‘North’ to the ‘South’ (Wood, 1994). This statistic is less 
surprising when the enormous difference in hourly labour costs between 
Australian and Indonesian workers is taken into account. In 1995 the total hourly 
cost of labour in Indonesia was 30 cents. In Australia, it was $US 14.40, or 48 
times more expensive (The Economist, 1996). The implicit leverage enjoyed by 
comparatively mobile firms in such circumstances means that the possibility of 
either resisting the demands of capital or establishing fraternal linkages based on 
common interests with labour elsewhere is clearly reduced. The critically 
important ‘insulation’ that geographically separate workers used to enjoy, and 
which effectively protected different standards of living is being eroded (Winters, 
1996). Moreover, rather than providing the material base for a more broadly-
based and internationalised working class as the likes of Levinson (1974:141) 
imagined, it has actually provided opportunities for internationally mobile capital 
to fuel rivalries between the more advantaged and disadvantaged workers 
located within individual nations.  
 
The potential for international cooperation remains limited, therefore, but not just 
by the enhanced power of capital. The logic of market-centred reform has 
become so pervasive in countries like Australia that the union movement's 
strategies - at least at the peak level - have become ambivalent and 
contradictory. The leadership of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU, 1995:11) - to which the ACTU is closely allied - is at pains to 
suggest that labour needs to be a cooperatively ally of business in a regional 
developmental context, a process to be guided by the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. Indeed, labour strategy toward these emergent and 
increasingly influential economic for a like APEC is predicated upon obtaining 
‘insider’ status and influencing its policy agenda (Evatt Foundation, 1994:253), 
despite APEC's dominance by champions of greater deregulation (Beeson, 
1996b).  
 
Indeed, the ACTU leadership in Australia appear to have become so accustomed 
to acting within an elite governed, corporatist framework, predicated upon 
authorised interest representation and privileged trade union access to 
government that they have consequently and conspicuously failed to recognize 
independent, non government-sanctioned unions in Indonesia (Casey, 1994). 
Though critical of the SPSI central leadership, former ACTU chief Martin 
Ferguson, for example, made revealingly dismissive public remarks about the 
SBSI (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Seluruh Indonesia: Indonesian Prosperous 
Workers Union), a fledgling independent union, while the organisation was under 
siege from the Indonesian government. 10 Similarly, senior ACTU official Alan 
Matheson expressed support for some dubious Indonesian government-initiated 
labour reforms, while casting doubt on the legitimacy of the SBSI as a trade 
union. 11  
 
Under various ALP governments the ACTU was generally supportive of policy 
toward Indonesia that attached considerable importance to developing closer 
government to government relations (Lawson, 1996). Despite US trade unionists 
criticizing the Australian government's failure to support trade and labour rights 
issues in the GATT forum, Prime Minister Paul Keating urged President Clinton 
to ‘soften’ his stronger human rights stance on Indonesia in order to curry favor 
with Indonesian President Soeharto (McIntyre, 1996).  
The comparative weakness of labour's overall international position is revealed 
by World Trade Organisation's capacity to enforce a neoliberal agenda of trade 
liberalisation, which stands in stark contrast to the International Labour 
Organisation's reliance in ‘moral suasion’ to encourage recognition of labour 
rights (Charnovitz, 1995). The idea of a ‘social clause,’ designed to establish a 
minimum benchmark for labour conditions and avoid a mutually destructive ‘race 
to the bottom’ as nations employ competitive austerity strategies is attractive, but 
has dependend on international brandname producers, such as Levi-Strauss and 
Nike developing international codes of conduct, which their subcontractors, at 
lest nominally, have to abide by. But as van Liemt points out, it is not obvious 
why such agreements should be restricted to the traded sectors of national 
economies, rather than more broadly conceived questions of human rights within 
national borders (van Liemt, 1989).  
 
At one level, labour's dependent position is simply a reflection of the enduring 
and growing ‘structural power’ of capital private business has always been able 
to use the implicit threat of capital strike or flight to ensure that its interests are 
uppermost in the minds of national and international policy makers (Gill and Law, 
1989). However, at another level, the power of capital over labour has been 
enhanced by deep-seated changes in an increasingly internationalised economy. 
Not only is capital more mobile and transnational, but a world-wide growth in 
structurally entrenched unemployment has effectively undermined the sorts of 
post-war accommodations that were embodied in welfare statism (Kapstein, 
1996). In both Australia and Indonesia, such changes have major implications for 
governments and labour.  
 
In Australia, the current Coalition government has used changes in the global 
economy to justify alterations to Australia's domestic accommodation, winding 
back the quasi-corporatist Accord arrangements and systematically attempting to 
utilize business to mount a concerted attack on organised labour (Long and 
Murphy, 1997). Faced with such inherently unfavourable conditions, labour in 
high-wage Australia has found itself forced to cooperate with local companies in 
order to achieved higher productivity and production flexibility and slow the shift 
of manufacturing off-shore (van Liemt, 1992). In Indonesia the government has 
maintained state corporatist arrangements as a way of maintaining stringent 
controls over labour and minimizing potential social disruption. Workers are told 
that their demands are eroding Indonesia's attractiveness - vis à vis other low 
wage countries like China and Vietnam - as an investment site for labour 
intensive production. In both countries, however, the external world economy has 
provided both the imperative and an important justification for the ‘necessity’ of 
policies that might otherwise have attracted greater resistance.  
 
Conclusion  
Although the degree of globalisation that has occurred over the last decade or so 
may have been overstated it has, nevertheless, provided a critically important 
source of leverage both for potentially mobile international firms, and for 
governments intent on pursuing policies aimed at controlling the potential 
influence of labour. While the techniques employed may reflect specific national 
circumstances and the place of local economic activity in international production 
structures, the leverage over labour that the reality and the rhetoric of 
globalisation provides for national governments is universal.  
 
Nor is it obvious what strategies labour might employ to counteract this 
fundamental shift in the balance of power between capital and labour. Not only 
does labour not enjoy capital's mobility, neither does it have a generalised, trans-
national set of interests to mobilize behind. As this case study demonstrates, the 
internationalisation of economic activity is throwing nationally-based, relatively 
immobile labour forces into competition with one another. Not only do these 
labour forces display great differences in their historical experiences and 
relations with national governments, they often have relatively little in common 
with each other. Indeed, trade union leaders in developed countries like Australia 
have been complicit in trying to maintain a world order in which they enjoyed a 
privileged position. Hopeful claims about ‘the objective conditions for international 
working class solidarity’ notwithstanding, labour forces in different countries are 
finding it difficult to establish common interests, let alone strategies in the face of 
capital's increasing power.  
 
The developments outlined above have profound implications for advanced 
industrial countries like Australia as well as late industrializing ones like 
Indonesia. If there is a clear link between labour strength and policies of 
domestic compensation, as Garrett (1996) suggests, then the further unraveling 
of the welfare state seems a likely prospect in Australia. Indonesian workers, on 
the other hand, are following an historical trajectory which is significantly different 
from the early industrializing nations. Given the specific context and timing of 
industrialisation, their struggles will not simply replicate the sorts of political 
accommodations which emerged as the product of earlier class conflict in Europe 
or Australia. Although it has been possible for Indonesia's workforce to make 
marginal improvements in its position, its future well-being is not assured. While 
nation-states continue to privilege the interests of trans-national capital over 
those of domestic labour-forces, and allow increasingly mobile international 
capital to play-off one labour force against another, the continuing, I decline of 
labour's collective international position seems certain.  
 
Notes  
(1.) For an Australian example of this sort see, Catley (1996). For Indonesian 
examples of the growing faith in globalisation and the market, see Chapter 6 of 
Chalmers and Hadiz (1996).  
(2.) A good example of this phenomenon was provided during recently elected 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard's first trip to Japan. Howard assured 
Australia's principal trade partner and a major investor in Australia that labour 
market reform was a central and inescapable part of the new government's 
agenda Gordon (1996).  
(3.) Not only has the notion of a ‘national economy’ become increasingly 
problematic in an increasingly internationalised economy dominated by 
multinational corporations, but the ‘competitiveness’ discourse shifts the burden 
of adjustment onto national workforces who are played off against each other 
and pressured to deliver ever greater productivity increases (Bryan, 1995).  
(4.) In spite of its marginalisation throughout the New Order, the labour 
movement has had a long history in Indonesia. As is suggested in the works of 
Ingleson and Shiraishi, this history stretches back to the early period of the 
nationalist struggle (Ingleson, 1986; Shiraishi, 1990). Sections of the labour 
movement were quite militant during early independence and effectively 
spearheaded the nationalisation of Dutch and other foreign-owned companies in 
1957 (Hawkins, 1963).  
(5.) See, for example, Ali Moertopo (1975) The Pancasila or ‘Five Principles’ 
refers to the state ideology which upholds ‘Belief in One God,’ ‘Humanitarianism,’ 
‘Indonesian Unity,’ ‘Consultative Democracy,’ and ‘Social Justice.’  
(6.) The identity of the interviewee as well as details of interview are undisclosed 
by request.  
(7.) Quoted in Nike in Indonesia (1995).  
(8.) Interview with Chung Dong-Jin, Korean factory-owner ill Jakarta, 30 March 
1994.  
(9.) It is significant that many of these more utopian readings of historical 
development either ignore or understate the crucial role that labour, through 
trade unions and socialist parties, played in the development of democratic 
political frameworks in the first industrializing nations of Europe. For a critique of 
such a reading see Therborn (1977), Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 
(1992). For the most influential of the utopian works, see Fukuyama (1992).  
(10.) SBS Television, Dateline (aired 3 December 1994). It is worth noting that 
Ferguson has also followed Bob Hawke's lead, and used the ACTU leadership as 
the basis for a political career in the ALP.  
(11.) Memorandum to Len Cooper (Australia-Asia Workers Links), 23 March 
(1994).  
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